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Abstract—Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS) is a new paradigm
which takes advantage of pervasive smartphones to efficiently
collect data, enabling numerous novel applications. To achieve
good service quality for a MCS application, incentive mecha-
nisms are necessary to attract more user participation. Most of
existing mechanisms apply only for the offline scenario where
all users’ information are known a priori. On the contrary,
we focus on a more realistic scenario where users arrive one
by one online in a random order. Based on the online auction
model, we investigate the problem that users submit their
private profiles to the crowdsourcer when they arrive, and
the crowdsourcer aims at selecting a subset of users before a
specified deadline for minimizing the total payment while a
specific number of tasks can be completed. We design three on-
line mechanisms, Homo-OMZ, Hetero-OMZ and Hetero-OMG,
all of which can satisfy the computational efficiency, individual
rationality, cost-truthfulness, and consumer sovereignty. The
Homo-OMZ mechanism is applicable to the homogeneous user
model and can satisfy the social efficiency but not constant
frugality. The Hetero-OMZ and Hetero-OMG mechanisms are
applicable to both the homogeneous and heterogeneous user
models, and can satisfy the constant frugality. Besides, the
Hetero-OMG mechanism can also satisfy the time-truthfulness.
Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance
and validate the theoretical properties of our online mecha-
nisms.
Index Terms—Crowdsourcing, Mobile Sensing, Incentive
Mechanism, Frugal Mechanism, Online Auction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing is a distributed problem-solving model
in which a crowd of undefined size is engaged to solve a
complex problem through an open call [1]. Nowadays, the
proliferation of smartphones provides a new opportunity for
extending existing web-based crowdsourcing applications
to a larger contributing crowd, making contribution easier
and omnipresent. Furthermore, today’s smartphones are
programmable and come with a rich set of cheap powerful
embedded sensors, such as GPS, WiFi/3G/4G interfaces,
accelerometer, digital compass, gyroscope, microphone,
and camera. The great potential of mobile phone sensing
offers a variety of novel, efficient ways to opportunistically
collect data, enabling numerous mobile crowd sensing
(MCS) applications, such as Sensorly [2] for constructing
cellular/WiFi network coverage maps, SignalGuru [3], Ner-
icell [4] and VTrack [5] for providing traffic information,
Ear-Phone [6] and NoiseTube [7] for making noise maps,
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and LiFS [8] for indoor localization. For more details, we
refer interested readers to several survey papers [1], [9],
[10].
Adequate user participation is one of the most critical
factors determining whether a MCS application can achieve
good service quality. Most of the current MCS applications
[2]–[8] are based on voluntary participation. While partici-
pating in a MCS campaign, smartphone users consume their
own resources such as battery and computing power, and
expose their locations with potential privacy threats. Thus,
incentive mechanisms are necessary to provide participants
with enough rewards for their participation costs. Most of
existing mechanisms [11]–[15] apply only for the offline
scenario as illustrated in Fig. 1(a), in which all of participat-
ing users report their profiles, including the tasks that they
can complete and the bids, to the crowdsourcer (campaign
organizer) in advance, and then the crowdsourcer selects a
subset of users after collecting the information of all users
to achieve a specific objective. Generally, there are two
classes of incentive mechanisms with different objectives:
the budget feasible mechanisms which aim at maximizing
the crowdsourcer’s utility (e.g., the total value of all tasks
that can be completed by selected users) under a specific
budget constraint, and the frugal mechanisms which aim
at minimizing the crowdsourcer’s total payment under the
condition that the specific tasks can be completed.
However, in most of MCS applications users always
arrive one by one online in a random order and user avail-
ability changes over time, which reflects the opportunistic
characteristics of human mobility in essence. For example,
in Sensorly [2] or Ear-Phone [6], the crowdsourcer allocates
tasks to the smartphone users for sensing Wi-Fi signals or
environmental noises only when the users arrive in the area
of interest opportunistically. Therefore, an online incentive
mechanism is necessary to make irrevocable decisions on
whether to accept a user’s task and bid sequentially, based
solely on the information of users arriving before the
present moment, without knowing future information, as
illustrated in Fig. 1(b) and Fig. 1(c).
Although the budget feasible online incentive mecha-
nisms have been investigated recently [16]–[19], in this
paper we focus on the online incentive mechanisms under
the framework of frugality. Specially, we consider the
following problem: the crowdsourcer aims at selecting a
subset of users before a specified deadline, so that the total
payment to the selected users can be minimized under the
condition that the specific number of tasks can be com-
pleted. We further assume that the cost and arrival/departure
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(b) Online scenario: zero arrival-departure in-
terval model
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(c) Online scenario: general interval model
Fig. 1. The comparison of offline and online scenarios for MCS.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF VARIOUS MECHANISMS PROPOSED IN THIS PAPER.
Mechanism
homogeneous heterogeneous i.i.d. secretary computational individual cost- consumer constant time-truthfulness
user model user model model model efficiency rationality truthfulness sovereignty frugality (general interval model)
Homo-OMZ Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No NA
Hetero-OMZ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NA
Hetero-OMG Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
time of each user are private and only known to itself. Users
are assumed to be game-theoretic and seek to make strategy
(possibly report an untruthful cost or arrival/departure time)
to maximize their individual utility in equilibrium. Thus, the
problem of selecting crowdsourcing users while minimizing
the total payment can be modeled as an online auction.
Our objective is to design online mechanisms satisfying
five desirable properties: computational efficiency, individ-
ual rationality, truthfulness, consumer sovereignty and con-
stant frugality. Informally, computational efficiency ensures
the mechanism can run in real time, individual rationality
ensures each participating user has a non-negative utility,
truthfulness ensures the participating users report their true
costs (cost-truthfulness) and arrival/departure times (time-
truthfulness), consumer sovereignty ensures each participat-
ing user has a chance to win the auction, and constant
frugality guarantees that the mechanism performs close to
the optimal solution in terms of total payment in the offline
scenario where all users’ information are known a priori.
In this paper, we consider various user models com-
prehensively from three perspectives: 1) the zero arrival-
departure interval model (as illustrated in Fig. 1(b)) and
the general interval model (as illustrated in Fig. 1(c))
with respect to the interval between the arrival time and
the departure time of each user, 2) the homogeneous user
model and the heterogeneous user model with respect to
the number of tasks that each user can complete, and 3)
the i.i.d. model and the secretary model with respect to the
distribution of users. We propose three online mechanisms,
Homo-OMZ, Hetero-OMZ and Hetero-OMG, that are ap-
plicable to different models and hold different properties,
as shown in Table I. Note that achieving time-truthfulness
is trivial in the zero arrival-departure interval model. The
main idea behind our online mechanisms is to adopt a
multiple-stage sampling-accepting process. At every stage
the mechanism allocates tasks to a user only if its bid is
not less than a certain bid threshold that has been computed
using previous users’ information, and the number of tasks
allocated for the current stage has not been achieved.
Meanwhile, the user obtains a bid-independent payment.
The bid threshold is computed in a manner that guarantees
desirable performance properties of the mechanism.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II we describe the MCS system model, and
formulate the problem as an online auction. We present two
online mechanisms, Homo-OMZ and Hetero-OMZ, under
the zero arrival-departure interval model in Section III.
We present the Hetero-OMZ mechanism under the general
interval model in Section IV. Performance evaluations are
presented in Section V. We review the related work in
Section VI, and conclude this paper in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
As illustrated in Fig. 1, a MCS system consists of a
crowdsourcer, which resides in the cloud and consists
of multiple sensing servers, and many smartphone users,
which are connected to the cloud by cellular networks (e.g.,
GSM/3G/4G) or Wi-Fi connections. The crowdsourcer first
publicizes a MCS campaign, aiming at finding some users
to complete a specified number L ∈ N+ of tasks. Then
the users interested in participating in the campaign report
their profiles to the crowdsourcer. Finally, the crowdsourcer
selects a subset of users to perform tasks for minimizing
the total payment based on the profiles of users. Fig. 1(a)
shows an offline scenario, where all of participating users
report their profiles to the crowdsourcer synchronously,
and then the crowdsourcer allocates tasks to a subset of
users by considering the profiles of all users at once.
Unlike the batched and synchronized manner in the offline
scenario, the interactive process in the online scenario is
3sequential and asynchronous, as shown in Fig. 1(b) and
Fig. 1(c). In this paper we focus on the online scenario.
Specially, we assume that the crowdsourcer requires L
tasks to be completed before a specific deadline T , and a
crowd of users U = {1, 2, . . . , n} interested in participating
in the campaign arrive online in a random order, where
n is unknown. Each user i ∈ U has an arrival time
ai ∈ {1, . . . , T }, a departure time di ∈ {1, . . . , T }, di ≥ ai,
and a number of tasks it can complete τi. Meanwhile, user
i also has an associated cost ci ∈ R+ for performing a
single task. All information constitutes the profile of user
i, θi = (ai, di, τi, ci). The crowdsourcer, when presented
with the profile of user i, must decide how many tasks to
allocate, and how much payment to pay to user i before
it departs. The decisions should be made one by one until
the deadline or all the tasks have been allocated.
B. User Model
In this paper we consider two models with respect to the
interval between the arrival time and the departure time of
each user:
• Zero arrival-departure interval model: The arrival
time of each user equals to its departure time.
• General interval model: There are no limitations on
the arrival-departure interval (i.e., it may be zero or
non-zero interval).
The first model is reasonable for the MCS applications
where the decision has to be made in time, as illustrated in
Fig. 1(b). For example, in LiFS [8], the users receive task
description when they enter the target building, and report
the profiles expecting the platform to reply immediately,
since they may not want to be disturbed anymore when they
are working or shopping in that building. Nevertheless, in
other scenarios, smartphone users may be patient to wait for
the reply of the crowdsourcer for some time interval. For
example, a user who is staying in a traffic tool or drinking
at a coffee shop may play with the crowdsourcer for some
time. In such scenarios, the general interval model should
be considered where the decision could be put off until
when the user departs, as illustrated in Fig. 1(c).
With respect to the number of tasks that each user can
complete, we consider the following two models:
• Homogeneous user model: Each user can complete
only a single task.
• Heterogeneous user model: Different users can com-
plete different number of tasks.
Obviously, the homogeneous user model is a special case
of the heterogeneous user model, and in the first model, we
denote the profile of each user i as θi = (ai, di, 1, ci).
With respect to the distribution of users, there are two
extremes of the modeling spectrums. At one extreme is the
oblivious adversarial model, where an adversary chooses a
worst-case input sequence including the users’ costs, task
numbers, and their arrival orders. This view leads to a
very pessimistic result: no online mechanisms can achieve
constant competitiveness [20], but this model is unneces-
sary to consider in a normal crowdsourcing market. At the
other extreme is a sequence of users with task numbers
and the respective unit costs i.i.d. sampled from a known
distribution. This view may lead to the optimum strategy
by using dynamic programming, but it assumes too much
knowledge to be practical. Thus, two natural candidate
models in between the two extremes are considered in this
paper:
• The i.i.d. model: The numbers of tasks that users
can complete and their respective unit costs are i.i.d.
sampled from some unknown distributions.
• The secretary model: An adversary gets to decide on
the numbers of tasks that users can complete and the
respective unit costs, but not on the order in which
they are presented to the crowdsourcer.
In fact, the i.i.d. model is a special case of the secretary
model, since the sequence can be determined by first
picking a multi-set of task numbers and costs from the
(unknown) distribution, and then permuting them randomly.
C. Online Auction
We model the interactive process between the crowd-
sourcer and users as an online auction. Users are assumed
to be game-theoretic and seek to make strategy to maximize
their individual utility in equilibrium. Each user i makes a
reserve price bi, called bid, based on its valuations on each
single task. Note that the arrival/departure time and cost
of user i are private and only known to itself. Only the
number of tasks τi must be true since the crowdsourcer
can identify whether the announced tasks are performed.
In other words, user i may misreport all information about
its profile except for τi. The crowdsourcer’s objective and
the deadline T are common knowledge. Although we do
not require a user to declare its departure time until the
moment of its departure, we find it convenient to analyze
our auctions as direct-revelation mechanisms (DRMs). The
strategy space in an online DRM allows a user to declare
some possibly untruthful profile θˆi = (aˆi, dˆi, τi, bi), subject
to ai ≤ aˆi ≤ dˆi ≤ di. Note that we assume that a user
cannot announce an earlier arrival time or a later departure
time than its true arrival/departure time. In order to com-
plete the required sensing tasks, the crowdsourcer needs to
design an online mechanism M = (f, p) consisting of an
allocation function f and a payment function p. For any
strategy sequence θˆ = (θˆ1, . . . , θˆn), the allocation function
f(θˆ) computes an allocation of tasks for a selected subset
of users S ⊆ U , and the payment function p(θˆ) returns a
vector (p1(θˆ), . . . , pn(θˆ)) of payments per task to the users.
That is, each selected user i ∈ S is allocated fi tasks at
price pi per task. Thus, in the homogeneous user model,
the utility of user i is
ui =
{
pi − ci, if i ∈ S;
0, otherwise.
In the heterogeneous user model, the utility of user i is
ui =
{
fi(pi − ci), if i ∈ S;
0, otherwise.
4TABLE II
FREQUENTLY USED NOTATIONS.
Notation Description
U , n, i set of users, number of users, and one user
L,L′ total number of tasks and stage-task-number
T, T ′, t deadline, end time step of each stage, and each
time step
ai, aˆi true arrival time and strategic arrival time of user
i
di, dˆi true departure time and strategic departure time
of user i
τi the number of tasks that user i can complete
ci, bi true cost and bid of user i for performing a single
task
θi, θˆi true profile and strategy of user i
S ,S ′ set of selected users and sample set
fi, pi, ui allocation, payment per task, and utility of user i
b∗ bid threshold
δ parameter used for computing the bid threshold
β initialized bid threshold
Note that, the crowdsourcer, when presented with the
strategy θˆi of user i, must decide whether to accept user i at
what price (pi) before the time step dˆi. In the homogeneous
user model, the crowdsourcer expects that the total payment
is minimized under the condition that at least L users are
selected before the deadline, i.e.,
Minimize
∑
i∈S
pi subject to |S| = L.
In the heterogeneous user model, the crowdsourcer expects
that the total payment is minimized under the condition that
at least L tasks are completed before the deadline, i.e.,
Minimize
∑
i∈S
fipi subject to
∑
i∈S
fi = L.
Table II lists frequently used notations in this paper.
D. Design Objective
Our objective is to design online mechanisms satisfying
the following five desirable properties:
• Computational Efficiency: A mechanism is computa-
tionally efficient if both the allocation and payment can
be computed in polynomial time as each user arrives.
• Individual Rationality: Each participating user will
have a non-negative utility: ui ≥ 0.
• Truthfulness: A mechanism is cost- and time-truthful
(or simply called truthful, or incentive compatible
or strategyproof ) if reporting the true cost and ar-
rival/departure time is a dominant strategy for all users.
In other words, no user can improve its utility by
submitting a false cost or arrival/departure time, no
matter what others submit.
• Consumer Sovereignty: The mechanism cannot arbi-
trarily exclude a user; each user will have a chance to
win the auction and obtain a payment if only its bid
is sufficiently low while others are fixed.
• Constant Frugality: The ideal goal of the mechanism
is to minimize the total payment of the crowdsourcer.
Although it is impossible to obtain an optimal solution
in the online scenario, we hope that the mechanism
can use as small payment as possible for performing
all tasks, namely achieving the frugality. Ideally, we
would like that the total payment made by the mech-
anism has a constant approximate ratio compared to
the minimal cost required for performing all tasks in
the offline scenario where the crowdsourcer has full
knowledge about users’ profiles. We call this ideal
objective as “idealistic frugality”. However, it is easy
to know that no truthful mechanism can perform well
even if in the offline scenario∗. Therefore, in this
paper we use an alternative objective, called as “re-
alistic frugality”. Specially, we use the frugality ratio
to measure the frugality as follows: given a number
of tasks to perform, L, we say that a mechanism is
α-frugal if it allocates L tasks in expectation while
guaranteeing that the total payment is no more than
the minimum cost required to complete αL tasks
in the offline scenario. Here, our goal is to design
mechanisms with a constant frugality ratio, namely
that the mechanisms can satisfy the constant frugality.
The importance of the first two properties is obvious,
because they together guarantee that the mechanisms can be
implemented in real time and satisfy the basic requirements.
In addition, the last three properties are indispensable
for guaranteeing the high performance and robustness.
The truthfulness aims at eliminating the fear of market
manipulation and the overhead of strategizing over others
for the participating users. The consumer sovereignty aims
at guaranteeing that each participating user has a chance
to win the auction, otherwise it will hinder the users’
competition or even result in task starvation. Besides, if
some users are guaranteed not to win the auction, then being
truthful or not will have the same outcome. For this reason,
the property satisfying both the consumer sovereignty and
truthfulness is also called strong truthfulness [21]. Later we
will show that satisfying the consumer sovereignty is not
trivial in the online scenario, which is in contrast to the
offline scenario. Finally, we emphasize that the frugality is
different from social efficiency which aims at minimizing
the total cost (not total payment) of selected users. It is
generally defined that, an online mechanism is O(g(n))-
competitive for social efficiency if the ratio between the total
cost achieved by this mechanism and the optimal offline
solution is O(g(n)).
III. ONLINE MECHANISM UNDER ZERO
ARRIVAL-DEPARTURE INTERVAL MODEL
In this section, we consider the zero arrival-departure
interval model where each user is impatient since the
decision must be made immediately once it arrives. Note
that achieving time-truthfulness is trivial in this model.
∗Consider an instance where a single user can complete all required
tasks at a very low cost ǫ, while every other user has a very high cost C.
It is not hard to know that any truthful mechanism that completes all tasks
must pay at least C, thus making the ratio between the total payment and
the minimal cost unbounded.
5It is because that any user has no incentive to report
a later arrival time or an earlier departure time than its
true arrival/departure time, since the user cannot perform
any sensing task or obtain a payment after it departs. To
facilitate understanding, it is also assumed that no two users
have the same arrival time. Note that this assumption can
be easily removed according to the revised mechanism in
Section IV.
A. Homogeneous User Mechanism
An online mechanism needs to overcome several non-
trivial challenges: first, the users’ costs are unknown and
need to be reported in a truthful manner; second, a specified
number of tasks should be completed before the deadline;
finally, the mechanism needs to cope with the online
arrival of users. In the homogeneous user model, if we do
not consider the truthfulness, then the mechanism design
problem becomes a k-choice secretary problem in essence.
There are two existing solutions [22], [23] that can achieve
a constant-factor approximation, and can be applied into on-
line auctions that satisfy the truthfulness. However, none of
two solutions can guarantee the consumer sovereignty. The
first solution [22] adopts a two-stage sampling-accepting
process: the first batch of users is rejected and used as
the sample which enables making an informed decision
on whether accepting the rest of users. In this case, the
first batch of users has no chance to win the auction no
matter how low its cost is. It can lead to undesirable
effects in our problem: automatically rejecting the first
batch of users encourages users to arrive late; in other
words, those users arriving early have no incentive to report
their bids, which may hinder the users’ competition or
even result in task starvation. Although the second solution
[23] adopts a multi-stage sampling-accepting process, at
the first stage it uses Dynkin’s algorithm [24] for the classic
secretary problem. Therefore, this solution cannot guarantee
the consumer sovereignty, as it is known that Dynkin’s
algorithm adopts a two-stage sampling-accepting process.
1) Mechanism Design: To address the above challenges,
we design an online mechanism, Homo-OMZ, by using
a multiple-stage sampling-accepting process. The mech-
anism dynamically increases the sample size and learns
a bid threshold used for future decision, while increas-
ing the stage-task-number it allocates at various stages.
The whole process is illustrated in Algorithm 1. We first
divide all of T time steps into (⌊log2 T ⌋ + 1) stages:
{1, 2, . . . , ⌊log2 T ⌋, ⌊log2 T ⌋ + 1}. The stage i ends at
time step T ′ = ⌊2i−1T/2⌊log2 T⌋⌋. Correspondingly, the
stage-task-number for the i-th stage is set to be L′ =
2i−1L/2⌊log2 T⌋, meaning that L′ tasks should be allocated
before the end time of this stage. Finally, L tasks in total
should be allocated before the deadline T . Fig. 2 is an
illustration when T = 8. When a stage is over, we add all
users who have arrived into the sample set S ′, and compute
a bid threshold b∗ according to the information of samples
and the allocated stage-task-number L′. This bid threshold
is computed by calling the GetBidThreshold1 algorithm
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4
L/8 L/4
L/2
L
t=1 t=2 t=4 t=8
T=8
Fig. 2. Illustration of a multiple-stage sampling-accepting process when
T = 8.
(to be elaborated later), and used for making decision at the
next stage. Specially, when the last stage i = ⌊log2 T ⌋+ 1
comes, the bid threshold has been computed according to
the information of all users arriving before time step ⌊T/2⌋,
and the allocated stage-task-number L/2.
When a new user i arrives, the mechanism allocates a
task to it as long as its bid is not less than the current bid
threshold b∗, and the allocated stage-task-number L′ has
not been achieved. Meanwhile, we give user i a payment:
pi = b
∗,
and add this user to the set of selected users S. To start the
mechanism, we initially set a large bid threshold β, which
is used for making decision at the first stage.
Since each stage maintains a common bid threshold, it is
natural to compute the lowest single price that many users
will accept from the sample set S ′ and the allocated stage-
task-number L′ as the bid threshold. Similar to the solution
of [23], we set the bid threshold equal to the L′-th lowest
bid in the sample set, as illustrated in Algorithm 2.
2) Mechanism Analysis: In the following we analyze the
properties of the Homo-OMZ mechanism from five aspects.
Algorithm 1: Homogeneous Online Mechanism under
Zero Arrival-departure Interval Model (Homo-OMZ)
Input: Task number L, deadline T
1 (t, T ′, L′,S ′, b∗,S)← (1, T
2⌊log2 T⌋
, L
2⌊log2 T⌋
, ∅, β, ∅);
2 while t ≤ T do
3 if there is a user i arriving at time step t then
4 if bi ≤ b∗ and |S| < L′ then
5 fi ← 1; pi ← b∗;
6 S ← S ∪ {i};
7 else
8 fi ← 0; pi ← 0;
9 end
10 S ′ ← S ′ ∪ {i};
11 end
12 if t = ⌊T ′⌋ then
13 b∗ ← GetBidThreshold1(L′,S ′);
14 T ′ ← 2T ′; L′ ← 2L′;
15 end
16 t← t+ 1;
17 end
Algorithm 2: GetBidThreshold1
Input: Stage-task-number L′, sample set S ′
1 Sort S ′ s.t. b1 ≤ b2 ≤ . . . ≤ b|S′|;
2 return bL′ ;
Lemma 1. The Homo-OMZ mechanism is computationally
efficient.
6Proof: Since the mechanism runs online, we only need
to focus on the computation complexity at each time step
t ∈ {1, . . . , T }. It is easy to know that the running time
of computing the allocation and payment of each user i
(lines 3-11) is O(1). Thus, the computation complexity
of the mechanism is dominated by the complexity of
computing the bid threshold (Algorithm 2). We can use any
computationally efficient sorting algorithm to implement
the Algorithm 2. For example, the computation complexity
of quick sorting algorithm is O(n logn). Thus, the Homo-
OMZ mechanism is computationally efficient.
Lemma 2. The Homo-OMZ mechanism is individually
rational.
Proof: From the lines 4-9 of Algorithm 1, we know
that pi ≥ bi if i ∈ S, otherwise pi = 0. Thus, we have
ui ≥ 0.
Designing a cost-truthful mechanism relies on the ra-
tionale of bid-independence. Let b−i denote the sequence
of bids arriving before the i-th bid bi, i.e., b−i =
(b1, . . . , bi−1). We call such a sequence prefixal. Let p′
be a function from prefixal sequences to prices (non-
negative real numbers). We extend the definition of bid-
independence [25] to the online scenario:
Definition 1 (Bid-independent Online Auction). An online
auction is called bid-independent if the allocation and
payment rules for each player i satisfy:
a) The auction constructs a price schedule p′(b−i);
b) If p′(b−i) ≥ bi, player i wins at price pi = p′(b−i);
c) Otherwise, player i is rejected, and pi = 0.
Proposition 1. ( [20], Proposition 2.1) An online auction
is cost-truthful if and only if it is bid-independent.
Lemma 3. The Homo-OMZ mechanism is cost-truthful.
Proof: Consider a user i that arrives at some stage
for which the bid threshold is b∗. If by the time the user
arrives there are no remaining tasks unallocated, then the
user’s cost declaration will not affect the allocation of the
mechanism and thus cannot improve its utility by submit-
ting a false cost. Otherwise, assume there are remaining
tasks to be allocated by the time when the user arrives. In
case ci ≤ b∗, reporting any cost below b∗ would not make
a difference in the user’s allocation and payment, and its
utility would be b∗ − ci ≥ 0. Declaring a cost above b∗
would make the worker lose the auction, and its utility
would be 0. In case ci > b∗, declaring any cost above
b∗ would leave the user unallocated with utility 0. If the
user declares a cost lower than b∗ it will be allocated. In
such a case, however, its utility will be negative. Hence the
user’s utility is always maximized by reporting its true cost:
bi = ci.
Lemma 4. The Homo-OMZ mechanism satisfies the con-
sumer sovereignty.
Proof: Each stage is an accepting process as well as a
sampling process ready for the next stage. As a result, users
are not automatically rejected during the sampling process,
and are allocated as long as their bids are not less than the
current bid threshold, and there are still remaining tasks
unallocated at the current stage.
According to the proof of Theorem 2.1 from [23], it
is easy to know that the expected total cost of the L
users selected by the Homo-OMZ mechanism is at most
1 + O(
√
1/L) times the sum of the L lowest costs of all
users. Thus, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 5. The Homo-OMZ mechanism is O(1)-
competitive for social efficiency.
The above five lemmas together prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. The Homo-OMZ mechanism satisfies the com-
putational efficiency, individual rationality, truthfulness,
consumer sovereignty, and constant competitiveness for
social efficiency under the homogeneous user model and
zero arrival-departure interval model.
B. Heterogeneous User Mechanism
Although the Homo-OMZ mechanism satisfies four de-
sirable properties (computational efficiency, individual ra-
tionality, truthfulness, and consumer sovereignty), and
achieves constant competitiveness for social efficiency, the
failure of guaranteeing good frugality makes it less attrac-
tive. To achieve good frugality, one possible direction is
to make use of the off-the-shelf results on the budgeted
feasible mechanisms [16]. The budgeted feasible mecha-
nism design problem is similar to our frugal mechanism
design problem, with the difference that the total payment
paid to the winners is a constraint instead of an objective
function. To address this issue, it is intuitive that we can
dynamically learn a budget that are enough for allocating
users for completing a specific number of tasks, then use
this budget to compute a bid threshold by using budget
feasible mechanisms, and finally use this bid threshold for
making further decisions. In the following, we present a
novel online mechanism Hetero-OMZ that satisfies all five
desirable properties including the frugality in the heteroge-
neous user model. Note that since the homogeneous user
model is a special case of the heterogeneous user model,
the Hetero-OMZ mechanism is a general solution for both
two models.
1) Mechanism Design: As illustrated in Algorithm 3, the
basic framework of the Hetero-OMZ mechanism is very
similar to the Homo-OMZ mechanism, with two differ-
ences: 1) each user may be allocated multiple tasks upper
bounded by the number of tasks that it has announced, as
long as its bid is not less than the current bid threshold
b∗, and the allocated stage-task-number L′ has not been
achieved; 2) it has a different approach to computing the
bid threshold, as illustrated in Algorithm 4.
To compute the bid threshold, we first find the minimal
cost for performing δL′ tasks from the sample set S ′. This
can be done by using a simple greedy algorithm which sorts
users according to their bids, and preferentially allocates
tasks to users with lower bids until that all of δL′ tasks have
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Input: Task number L, deadline T
1 (t, T ′, L′,S ′, b∗,S)← (1, T
2⌊log2 T⌋
, L
2⌊log2 T⌋
, ∅, β, ∅);
2 while t ≤ T do
3 if there is a user i arriving at time step t then
4 if bi ≤ b∗ and
∑
j∈S fj < L
′ then
5 fi ← min{τi, L
′ −
∑
j∈S fj}; pi ← b
∗;
6 S ← S ∪ {i};
7 else
8 fi ← 0; pi ← 0;
9 end
10 S ′ ← S ′ ∪ {i};
11 end
12 if t = ⌊T ′⌋ then
13 b∗ ← GetBidThreshold2(L′,S ′);
14 T ′ ← 2T ′; L′ ← 2L′;
15 end
16 t← t+ 1;
17 end
Algorithm 4: GetBidThreshold2
Input: Stage-task-number L′, sample set S ′
1 J ← ∅; i← argminj∈S′ bj ;
2 while
∑
j∈J fj < δL
′ do
3 fi ← min{τi, δL
′ −
∑
j∈J fj};
4 J ← J ∪ {i};
5 i← argminj∈S′\J bj ;
6 end
7 B ←
∑
j∈J fjbj ;
8 p← BudgetFeasibleMechanism(B,S ′);
9 return p;
been allocated (lines 1-6). Here we set δ > 1 to obtain a
slight overestimate of the required budget for allocating L′
tasks. Intuitively, if the value of δ is too small, the budget
will be not enough that the required number of tasks can be
allocated at the next stage. Conversely, if the value of δ is
too large, the budget will be wasted, which will result in a
bad frugality. Later we will fix the value of δ elaborately to
enable the mechanism achieving a constant frugality ratio.
Second, we use the total payment for performing δL′ tasks
as the budget B (line 7), and then compute a bid threshold
from the sample set S ′ and the budget B by using the
budget feasible mechanism (line 8).
Note that the budget feasible mechanism is an offline
procedure proposed by [16], which has access all bids. As
illustrated in Algorithm 5, it also adopts a greedy strategy.
First, users are sorted according to their bids so that:
b1 ≤ b2 ≤ · · · b|S′|. When given a price at p = bi and the
remaining budget B−p
∑
j∈J fj , the number of tasks that
a user could be allocated at this price without exceeding
the budget constraint is fi = min{τi, ⌊Bp ⌋ −
∑
j∈J fj}.
Then we find the largest k such that bk ≤ B∑k−1
j=1
fj+1
.
The set of selected users is J = {1, 2, . . . k}. Finally, the
bid threshold is set to be bk. This mechanism follows the
proportional share allocation rule in essence. It has a good
property that it sets a common price which on one hand
is high enough so that enough users could accept and on
the other hand is low enough so that the budget could be
efficiently exploited.
Algorithm 5: BudgetFeasibleMechanism [16]
Input: Budget constraint B, sample set S ′
1 J ← ∅; i← argminj∈S′ bj ;
2 while bi ≤ B∑
j∈J fj+1
do
3 p← bi;
4 fi ← min{τi, ⌊
B
p
⌋ −
∑
j∈J fj};
5 J ← J ∪ {i};
6 i ← argminj∈S′\J bj ;
7 end
8 return p;
In the following, we use an example to illustrate how the
Hetero-OMZ mechanism works.
Example 1. Consider a crowdsourcer with the number of
tasks to perform L = 8 and the deadline T = 8. There
are five users arriving online before the deadline with the
following profiles: θ1 = (1, 1, 4, 2), θ2 = (2, 2, 4, 4), θ3 =
(4, 4, 4, 5), θ4 = (6, 6, 4, 1), and θ5 = (7, 7, 4, 3).
We set β = 5 and δ = 2. Then the Hetero-OMZ
mechanism works as follows.
⋄ t = 1: (T ′, L′,S ′, b∗,S) = (1, 1, ∅, 5, ∅), f1 = 1, p1 =
5, S = {1}, S ′ = {1}. Update the bid threshold:
b∗ = 2.
⋄ t = 2: (T ′, L′,S ′, b∗,S) = (2, 2, {1}, 2, {1}), f2 =
0, p2 = 0, S = {1}, S ′ = {1, 2}. Update the bid
threshold: b∗ = 2.
⋄ t = 4: (T ′, L′,S ′, b∗,S) = (4, 4, {1, 2}, 2, {1}), f3 =
0, p3 = 0, S = {1}, S ′ = {1, 2, 3}. Update the bid
threshold: b∗ = 4.
⋄ t = 6: (T ′, L′,S ′, b∗,S) = (8, 8, {1, 2, 3}, 4, {1}),
f4 = 4, p4 = 4, S = {1, 4}, S ′ = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
⋄ t = 7: (T ′, L′,S ′, b∗,S) = (8, 8, {1, 2, 3, 4}, 4, {1, 4}),
f5 = 3, p5 = 4, S = {1, 4, 5}, S ′ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
Finally, the set of selected users is S = {1, 4, 5}, and
the payments to these selected 3 users are 5, 16, and
12 respectively.
2) Mechanism Analysis: It can be proved that the
Hetero-OMZ mechanism also satisfies the computational
efficiency, individual rationality, truthfulness, and consumer
sovereignty, with very similar proof of the Homo-OMZ
mechanism. In the following we prove that the Hetero-OMZ
mechanism can achieve a constant frugality ratio under
both the i.i.d. model and the secretary model by elaborately
fixing different value of δ in Algorithm 4.
If the stage-task-number could be achieved at each
stage, then L tasks would be allocated finally. Since our
Hetero-OMZ mechanism consists of multiple stages, and
dynamically increases the stage-task-number, it only needs
to prove that L/2 tasks could be allocated at the last
stage while the total payment is no more than the budget
B. In this case, the frugality ratio would be δ, since
at the last stage the budget B is the minimal cost for
8performing δL′ = δL/2 tasks according to Algorithm 4.
In order to facilitate analysis, we change the stage-task-
number constraint into the budget constraint at each stage
in Algorithm 3. Specially, in line 4 of Algorithm 3, the
condition
∑
j∈S fj < L
′ is replaced with
∑
j∈S pjfj < B,
and in line 5, the allocation fi ← min{τi, L′−
∑
j∈S fj} is
replaced with fi ← min{τi, ⌊(B−
∑
j∈S pjfj)/b
∗⌋}. Note
that in this case, if we prove that at least L/2 tasks could
be allocated at the last stage under the budget constraint B,
then it is equivalent to that L/2 tasks could be allocated
while the total payment is no more than B, meaning that
the frugality ratio is δ. In the following analysis, we use
the modified version of Algorithm 3.
For ease of illustration, we first introduce more notations
and concepts.
• Z denotes the set of selected users computed by
Algorithm 5 based on the set of users U arriving before
T and the budget 2B. The bid threshold of Z is p.
• S ′ denotes the sample set obtained when the stage
⌊log2 T ⌋ is over, which consists of all users arriving
before the time ⌊T/2⌋.
• Z1 and Z2 denote the subsets of Z that appears in the
first and second half of the input stream, respectively.
Thus we have Z1 = Z ∩ S ′, and Z2 = Z ∩ {U\S ′}.
• Z ′1 denotes the set of selected users computed by
Algorithm 5 based on the sample set S ′ and the budget
B. The bid threshold of Z ′1 is p′1.
• Z ′2 denotes the set of selected users computed by
Algorithm 3 at the last stage.
• The total number of tasks allocated to a set of selected
users X is denoted by a function f(X ) =
∑
i∈X fi.
Before analyzing the frugality formally, we introduce a
lemma about Algorithm 5.
Lemma 6. ( [16], Lemma 3.1) For a given sample set of
users, let L be the maximal number of tasks that can be
allocated under a given budget. Then at least L/2 tasks
can be allocated under budget at the price computed by
Algorithm 5.
According to Lemma 6, we have f(Z ′1) ≥ δL′/2 =
δL/4.
Lemma 7. When δ = 2, we have E[f(Z ′2)] ≥ L/2 under
the i.i.d. model.
The proof of Lemma 7 is given in Appendix A.
Different from the i.i.d. model, under the secretary model
we make Z denote the set of selected users computed by
Algorithm 5 based on the set of users U arriving before
T and the budget B. Other notations and concepts remain
unchanged. In addition, it is assumed that the number of
tasks that each user can complete is at most f(Z)/ω.
In order to facilitate analysis, we introduce a lemma as
follows.
Lemma 8. ( [26], Lemma 16) For sufficiently large ω, the
random variable |f(Z1) − f(Z2)| is bounded by f(Z)/2
with a constant probability.
Because f(X ) is a linear function, we have f(Z1) +
f(Z2) = f(Z). Thus, Lemma 8 can be easily extended to
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For sufficiently large ω, both f(Z1) and
f(Z2) are at least f(Z)/4 with a constant probability.
Lemma 9. For sufficiently large ω, when δ = 8, we
have f(Z ′2) ≥ L/2 with a constant probability under the
secretary model.
The proof of Lemma 9 is given in Appendix B. The
above analysis proves the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The Hetero-OMZ mechanism satisfies the
computational efficiency, individual rationality, truthful-
ness, consumer sovereignty, and constant frugality under
the zero arrival-departure interval model.
IV. ONLINE MECHANISM UNDER GENERAL INTERVAL
MODEL
In this section, we consider the general interval model,
and there may be multiple online users in the auction
simultaneously. Firstly, we change the settings of Example
1 to show that the Hetero-OMZ mechanism is not time-
truthful in the general interval model.
Example 2. All the settings are the same as Example 1
except for that user 1 has a non-zero arrival-departure
interval, a1 < d1. Specially, the profile of user 1 is
θ1 = (1, 5, 4, 2).
In this example, if user 1 report its profile truthfully, then
it will obtain the payment 5 according to the Hetero-OMZ
mechanism. However, if user 1 delays announcing its arrival
time and reports θ′1 = (5, 5, 4, 2), then it will improve its
payment to 20 according to the Hetero-OMZ mechanism
(the detailed computing process is omitted).
In the following, we will present a new online mech-
anism, Hetero-OMG, and prove that it satisfies all five
desirable properties in the general interval model.
A. Mechanism Design
Since the Hetero-OMZ mechanism can be applied in
both the homogeneous user model and the heterogeneous
user model, and can satisfy several desirable properties,
we adopt a similar algorithm framework under the general
interval model. Meanwhile, in order to guarantee the cost-
and time-truthfulness, it is necessary to modify the Hetero-
OMZ mechanism based on three principles. First, any
user is added to the sample set only when it departs;
otherwise, the bid-independence will be destroyed if its
arrival-departure time spans multiple stages, because a user
can indirectly affect its payment now. Second, if there are
multiple users who have not yet departed at some time,
we sort these online users according to the numbers of
tasks that they can complete, instead of their bids, and
preferentially select those users with higher number of
tasks. In this way, the bid-independence can be held. Third,
whenever a new time step arrives, it scans through the list
of users who have not yet departed and allocates tasks
9to those whose bids are not larger than the current bid
threshold under the stage-task-number constraint, even if
some arrived much earlier. At the departure time of any
user who was selected as a winner, the user is paid for a
payment equal to the maximum payment attained during
the user’s reported arrival-departure interval, even if this
payment is larger than the payment at the time step when
the user was selected as a winner.
Algorithm 6: Heterogeneous Online Mechanism under
General Interval Model (Hetero-OMG)
Input: Task Number L, deadline T
1 (t, T ′, L′,S ′, b∗,S)← (1, T
2⌊log2 T⌋
, L
2⌊log2 T⌋
, ∅, β, ∅);
2 while t ≤ T do
3 Add all new users arriving at time step t to a set of
online users O; O′ ← O \ S;
4 repeat
5 i← argmaxj∈O′ τj ;
6 if bi ≤ b∗ and
∑
j∈S fj < L
′ then
7 fi ← min{τi, L
′ −
∑
j∈S fj}; pi ← b
∗;
8 S ← S ∪ {i};
9 else
10 fi ← 0; pi ← 0;
11 end
12 O′ ← O′ \ {i};
13 until O′ = ∅;
14 Remove all users departing at time step t from O, and
add them to S ′;
15 if t = ⌊T ′⌋ then
16 b∗ ← GetBidThreshold2(L′,S ′);
17 T ′ ← 2T ′; L′ ← 2L′; O′ ← O;
18 repeat
19 i← argmaxj∈O′ τj ;
20 if bi ≤ b∗ and
min{τi, L
′ + fi −
∑
j∈S fj}b
∗ > fipi then
21 fi ← min{τi, L
′ + fi −
∑
j∈S fj};
pi ← b
∗;
22 if i /∈ S then S ← S ∪ {i};
23 end
24 O′ ← O′ \ {i};
25 until O′ = ∅;
26 end
27 t← t+ 1;
28 end
According to the above principles, we design the Hetero-
OMG mechanism satisfying all desirable properties under
the general interval model, as described in Algorithm 6.
Specially, we consider two cases. The first case is when the
current time step t is not at the end of any stage. In this
case, the bid threshold remains unchanged. The following
operations (the lines 3-14 in Algorithm 6) are performed.
First, all new users arriving at time step t are added to a
set of online users O. Then we make decision on whether
to select these online users one by one in the order of the
numbers of tasks that they can complete; the users who can
complete more tasks will be selected first. If an online user
i has been selected as a winner before time step t, we need
not to make decision on it again because it is impossible
to obtain a higher payment than before (to be proved later
in Appendix C). Otherwise, we need to make decision on
it again: it will be allocated multiple tasks upper bounded
by the number of tasks that it has announced, as long as
its bid is not less than the current bid threshold b∗, and
the allocated stage-task-number L′ has not been achieved;
meanwhile, we pay user i at price pi = b∗ per task, and
add it to the set of selected users S. Finally, we remove all
users departing at time step t from O, and add them to the
sample set S ′.
The second case is when the current time step is just at
the end of some stage. In this case, the bid threshold will
be updated. The mechanism works as the lines 16-25. We
need to make decision on whether to select these online
users, and at what prices, one by one in the order of the
numbers of tasks that they can complete, no matter whether
they have ever been selected as the winners before time step
t. As shown in the lines 20-23, if user i can obtain a higher
payment than before (this could be because that this user
is given a higher price or is allocated more tasks), its price
or number of tasks allocated will be updated. Meanwhile,
if user i has never been selected as a winner before time
step t, it will be added to the set S.
Return to Example 2. If all of the five users report their
types truthfully, then the Hetero-OMG mechanism works
as follows.
⋄ t = 1: (T ′, B′,S ′, b∗,S) = (1, 1, ∅, 5, ∅), f1 = 1,
p1 = 5, S = {1}, S ′ = ∅. Update the bid threshold:
b∗ = 5, update the allocation and payment of user 1:
f1 = 2, p1 = 5.
⋄ t = 2: (T ′, B′,S ′, b∗,S) = (2, 2, ∅, 5, {1}), f2 = 0,
p2 = 0, S = {1}, S
′ = {2}. Update the bid threshold:
b∗ = 4, update the allocation and payment of user 1:
f1 = 4, p1 = 4.
⋄ t = 4: (T ′, B′,S ′, b∗,S) = (4, 4, {2}, 4, {1}), f3 =
0, p3 = 0, S = {1}, S ′ = {2, 3}. Update the bid
threshold: b∗ = 5, update the allocation and payment
of user 1: f1 = 4, p1 = 5.
⋄ t = 5: user 1 departs, so S ′ = {1, 2, 3}.
⋄ t = 6: (T ′, B′,S ′, b∗,S) = (8, 8, {1, 2, 3}, 5, {1}),
f4 = 4, p4 = 5, S = {1, 4}, S ′ = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Now
all of 8 tasks have been allocated.
⋄ t = 7: (T ′, B′,S ′, b∗,S) = (8, 8, {1, 2, 3, 4}, 5, {1, 4}),
f5 = 0, p5 = 0, S = {1, 4}, , S ′ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
Thus, user 1 can obtain the payment 20 according to the
Hetero-OMG mechanism. Even if user 1 delays announcing
its arrival time and reports θ′1 = (5, 5, 4, 2), it still cannot
improve its payment (the detailed computing process is
omitted). Therefore, the time-truthfulness can be guaranteed
in the general interval model.
B. Mechanism Analysis
It is convenient to prove that the Hetero-OMG mecha-
nism also satisfies the computational efficiency, individual
rationality, consumer sovereignty, and constant frugality
as Hetero-OMZ (with almost the same proof), although
Hetero-OMG may have slightly higher frugality ratio than
Hetero-OMZ. Most importantly, we can prove the truthful-
ness of the Hetero-OMG mechanism.
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Lemma 10. The Hetero-OMG mechanism is cost- and
time-truthful.
The proof of Lemma 10 is given in Appendix C.
Theorem 3. The Hetero-OMG mechanism satisfies the
computational efficiency, individual rationality, budget fea-
sibility, truthfulness, consumer sovereignty, and constant
frugality under the general interval model.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the performance of our online mechanisms,
we implemented Homo-OMZ, Hetero-OMZ and Hetero-
OMG, and compared them against the following two bench-
marks. The first benchmark is the optimal offline solution
which has full knowledge about all users’ profiles. This can
be done by using a simple greedy algorithm as illustrated
in Algorithm 4 (lines 1-6), which sorts users according to
their bids, and preferentially allocates tasks to users with
lower bids until that all of tasks have been allocated. The
second benchmark is the random mechanism, which adopts
a naive strategy, i.e., rewards users based on an uninformed
fixed bid threshold.
A. Evaluation under Homogeneous User Model and Zero
Arrival-departure Interval Model
We first evaluate the Homo-OMZ and Hetero-OMZ
mechanisms under the homogeneous user model and zero
arrival-departure interval model.
Simulation Setup: We set the deadline to T=1800s, and
vary the number L of tasks to be completed from 100 to
400 with the increment of 100. Users arrive according to a
Poisson process in time with arrival rate λ = 0.6. For each
user i ∈ U , we set that: ai = di, τi = 1, ci ∼ U [1, 10],
where U [a, b] denotes a uniform distribution over [a, b]. For
the Hetero-OMZ mechanism, we set δ = 1 and δ = 2
respectively, and β = 10. As we proved in Lemma 7, when
δ = 2 the Hetero-OMZ mechanism is constant-frugal. Here
we also set δ = 1 for comparison. For the optimal offline
mechanism, we compute the minimum cost of performing
L and 2L tasks in order to obtain frugality ratios under
the two frameworks of “idealistic frugality” and “realistic
frugality”, respectively. For the random mechanism, we
obtain the average performance of 50 such solutions for
evaluations, where in each solution the bid threshold is
chosen at random from the range of 1 to 10.
Simulation Results: Fig. 3(a) compares the crowd-
sourcer’s total payment required by the Homo-OMZ and
Hetero-OMZ mechanisms against the two benchmarks. Fig.
3(b) compares the number of tasks completed by the three
online mechanisms. From the simulation results, we can
observe the following four phenomena:
• The total payments of all evaluated mechanisms in-
crease with the number of tasks, and the growth rate
is larger than 1 (except for the random mechanism).
It is because that the user set is limited, and the users
with higher costs must be selected if more tasks are
required to be completed.
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Fig. 3. Evaluation results under the homogeneous user model and zero
arrival-departure interval model.
• Both of the Homo-OMZ and Hetero-OMZ mechanisms
outweigh the random mechanism. Note that, although
the random mechanism has less total payment under
some cases, it has many tasks uncompleted, and the
average price per task is higher than that of the other
mechanisms.
• Only the Hetero-OMZ mechanism with δ = 2 can
complete all of required tasks under various cases,
although it requires higher total payment than the
Homo-OMZ mechanism and the Hetero-OMZ mech-
anism with δ = 1. Note that, at most 828 tasks can
be completed (by the optimal offline mechanism) in
our simulations, and a half of these tasks (414 tasks)
can be completed by the Hetero-OMZ mechanism with
δ = 2 (see Fig. 3(b)). In fact, it implies a trade-off
between the frugality and the number of completed
tasks, which should be considered by the mechanism
designer. Anyway, the Hetero-OMZ mechanism is a
good choice to guarantee the completion of required
tasks without sacrificing the frugality.
• The total payment of the Hetero-OMZ mechanism
with δ = 2 is less than the optimal offline mechanism
with 2L tasks, indicating that the “realistic” frugality
ratio is less than 2, which is consistent with our theo-
retical analysis in Lemma 7. Moreover, by comparing
the total payments of the Hetero-OMZ mechanism
with δ = 2 and the optimal offline mechanism with
L tasks, we have that the “idealistic” frugality ratio
is less than 2.5. Anyway, it has been verified that the
Hetero-OMZ mechanism can guarantee the constant
frugality.
B. Evaluation under Heterogeneous User Model
Now we evaluate the Hetero-OMZ and Hetero-OMG
mechanisms under the heterogeneous user model.
Simulation Setup: We set the deadline to T=1800s, and
vary L from 100 to 1000 with the increment of 100. Users
arrive according to a Poisson process in time with arrival
rate λ, and we vary λ from 0.2 to 1 with the increment
of 0.2. For each user i ∈ U , we set that: τi ∼ U [1, 10],
ci ∼ U [1, 10]. For the Hetero-OMZ mechanism, each user
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has zero arrival-departure interval. For the Hetero-OMG
mechanism, the arrival-departure interval of each user is
uniformly distributed over [0,300] seconds. For both of the
above two mechanisms, we set δ = 2 and β = 10. The
settings of the optimal offline mechanism and the random
mechanism are the same as in Section V-A.
Simulation Results: Fig. 4 compares the crowdsourcer’s
total payment required by the Hetero-OMZ and Hetero-
OMG mechanisms against the two benchmarks . Fig. 5
compares the average price per task required by various
mechanisms. From the simulation results, we can observe
the following four phenomena:
• From Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 5(a), we can observe that
all evaluated mechanisms (expect for the random
mechanism) require less total payment and average
price per task when more users participate. From Fig.
4(b) and Fig. 5(b), we can observe that all evaluated
mechanisms require higher total payment and average
price per tasks (except for the random mechanism)
when the number of tasks increases.
• Both of the Hetero-OMZ and Hetero-OMG mecha-
nisms outweigh the random mechanism in terms of
both the total payment and average price per task. Note
that, although the random mechanism has less total
payment or average price per task under some cases,
it has many tasks uncompleted. By contrast, both of
the other mechanisms can complete all required tasks.
• The total payment of the Hetero-OMZ mechanism
is less than the optimal offline mechanism with 2L
tasks, indicating that the “realistic” frugality ratio is
less than 2, which is consistent with our theoretical
analysis in Lemma 7. Moreover, by comparing the
total payments of the Hetero-OMZ mechanism and the
optimal offline mechanism with L tasks, we have that
the “idealistic” frugality ratio is less than 2.4. Anyway,
it has been verified that the Hetero-OMZ mechanism
can guarantee the constant frugality.
• The total payment of the Hetero-OMG mechanism
is very close to the optimal offline mechanism with
2L tasks, indicating that the “realistic” frugality ratio
is close to 2. Besides, the Hetero-OMG mechanism
requires higher total payment and average price per
tasks than the Hetero-OMZ mechanism in order to
guarantee the time-truthfulness.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Mechanism Design for Mobile Crowd Sensing
Reddy et al. [27] developed recruitment frameworks to
enable the crowdsourcer to identify well-suited participants
for data collections. However, they focused only on the
user selection instead of the incentive mechanism design.
At present, there are some studies [11]–[15] on incentive
mechanism design for MCS applications in the offline
scenario. Generally, two system models are considered:
the platform/crowdsourcer-centric model where the crowd-
sourcer provides a fixed reward to participating users, and
the user-centric model where users can have their reserve
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
Arrival rate (λ)
To
ta
l p
ay
m
en
t
 
 
Optimal (offline, 2L)
Optimal (offline, L)
Hetero−OMZ (online)
Hetero−OMG (online)
Random (online)
(a) Impact of λ (L = 500)
0 200 400 600 800 10000
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
Number of tasks (L)
To
ta
l p
ay
m
en
t
 
 
Optimal (offline, 2L)
Optimal (offline, L)
Hetero−OMZ (online)
Hetero−OMG (online)
Random (online)
(b) Impact of L (λ = 0.6)
Fig. 4. The total payment under the heterogeneous user model.
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Fig. 5. The average price per task under the heterogeneous user model.
prices for the sensing service. For the crowdsourcer-centric
model, incentive mechanisms were designed by using a
Stackelberg game [13], [14]. The Nash Equilibrium and
Stackelberg Equilibrium were computed as the solution,
where the costs of all users or their probability distribution
was assumed to be known. In contrast, the user-centric
model allows that each user has a private cost only known
to itself. Danezis et al. [11] developed a sealed-bid second-
price auction to estimate the users’ value of sensing data
with location privacy. Lee and Hoh [12] designed and
evaluated a reverse auction based dynamic price incentive
mechanism, where users can sell their sensed data to a
service provider with users’ claimed bids. Jaimes et al. [15]
proposed a recurrent reverse auction incentive mechanism
with a greedy algorithm that selects a representative subset
of the users according to their location given a fixed
budget. Yang et al. [14] designed an auction-based incentive
mechanism, and proved this mechanism was computation-
ally efficient, individually rational, profitable, and truthful.
However, all of these studies failed to account for the online
arrival of users.
Recently, some researchers have begun to focus on online
mechanism design for crowdsourcing markets [16]–[19],
[28]. Singer et al. [16] and Singla et al. [17] presented
incentive mechanisms for maximizing a linear utility func-
tion based on the bidding model and the posted price
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model respectively. Badanidiyuru et al. [18] and Zhao et
al. [19] considered incentive mechanisms for maximizing
a submodular utility function. However, all of the above
studies mainly focus on budget feasible mechanisms. Zhang
et al. [28] considered incentive mechanisms for maximizing
the platform utility, which is defined as the total value of
selected users minus the total cost. Only Singer et al. [16]
considered the frugal mechanisms partially, but it failed to
consider the consumer sovereignty and time-truthfulness.
B. Online Auctions and Generalized Secretary Problems
Online auction is the essence of many networked mar-
kets, in which information about goods, agents, and out-
comes is revealed one by one online in a random order,
and the agents must make irrevocable decisions without
knowing future information. Combining optimal stopping
theory with game theory provides us a powerful tool to
model the actions of rational agents in an online auction.
The theory of optimal stopping is concerned with the
problem of choosing a time to take a particular action,
in order to maximize an expected reward or minimize an
expected cost. A classic problem of optimal stopping theory
is the secretary problem: designing an algorithm for hiring
one secretary from a pool of n applicants arriving online, to
maximize the probability of hiring the best secretary [24].
Many variants of the classic secretary problem have been
studied in the literature and the most relevant to this work
is the k-choice secretary problem, in which the interviewer
is allowed to hire up to k ≥ 1 applicants in order to
maximize performance of the secretarial group based on
their overlapping skills. Kleinberg [23] and Babaioff et
al. [22] presented two constant competitive algorithms
for a special k-choice secretary problem in which the
objective function is a linear one, equaling to the sum of
the individual values of selected applicants. They could
also be used for minimizing the total cost of selected
applicants in essence. However, they failed to consider
the truthfulness and consumer sovereignty. Although some
solutions ( [21], [23], [29]) of online auctions provided
good ideas of designing truthful mechanisms, they still
could not satisfy the consumer sovereignty. Moreover, all
of these solutions only applied to the homogeneous user
model instead of the heterogeneous user model, and could
only satisfy the social efficiency instead of the frugality.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have investigated online incentive
mechanisms for mobile crowd sensing. We focus on frugal
mechanisms which aim at minimizing the total payment
while a specific number of tasks can be completed. We have
designed three online mechanisms that are applicable to
different models and hold different properties. The Homo-
OMZ mechanism is applicable to the homogeneous user
model and can satisfy the social efficiency but not constant
frugality. The Hetero-OMZ and Hetero-OMG mechanisms
are applicable to both the homogeneous and heteroge-
neous user models, and can satisfy the constant frugality.
The Hetero-OMG mechanism can also satisfy the time-
truthfulness under a general interval model. Besides, all
of these three mechanisms can satisfy the computational
efficiency, individual rationality, cost-truthfulness, and con-
sumer sovereignty.
An interesting open problem is to design frugal online
incentive mechanisms for more complex scenarios. For
example, each user can complete a subset of tasks, and
the crowdsourcer wants to complete the whole set of tasks,
or obtain a specific value from selected users where the
value function is submodular.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 7
Since the numbers of tasks that users can complete and
the respective unit costs are i.i.d., each user can be selected
in the set Z with the same probability. The sample set
S ′ is a random subset of U since all users arrive in a
random order. Therefore, the number of users from Z in
the sample set S ′ follows a hypergeometric distribution
H(n/2, |Z|, n). Thus, we have E[|Z1|] = E[|Z2|] = |Z|/2.
The number of tasks allocated to each user can be seen
as an i.i.d. random variable, and because f(X ) is a linear
function, it can be derived that: E[f(Z1)] = E[f(Z2)] =
E[f(Z)]/2. The expected total payments to the users from
both Z1 and Z2 are B. Since f(Z ′1) is computed under
budget B, it can be derived that: E[f(Z ′1)] = E[f(Z1)] =
E[f(Z)]/2, and E[p′1] = E[p].
We consider two cases according to the total payment to
the selected users at the last stage as follows.
Case 1): The budget B is exhausted.
In this case, since the price per task paid to each selected
user is p′1, so we have that
f(Z ′2) =
B
p′1
≥ f(Z ′1) ≥
δL
4
≥
L
2
,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that the total
payment to Z ′1 should be no more than the budget B, i.e.,
p′1f(Z
′
1) ≤ B.
Case 2): The budget B is not exhausted.
Since E[p′1] = E[p], each user i ∈ Z2 will be allocated in
Z ′2. It implies that:
E[f(Z ′2)] = E[f(Z2)] ≥
L
2
.
Combining case 1) and case 2), we have that at least L/2
tasks will be allocated at the last stage in expectation.
B. Proof of Lemma 9
We consider two cases according to the total payment to
the selected users at the last stage as follows.
Case 1): The budget B is exhausted.
In this case, since the price per task paid to each selected
user is p′1, so we have that
f(Z ′2) =
B
p′1
≥ f(Z ′1) ≥
δL
4
≥ 2L,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that the total
payment to Z ′1 should be no more than the budget B, i.e.,
p′1f(Z
′
1) ≤ B.
Case 2): The budget B is not exhausted.
Because p′1 is computed over a smaller subset compared
with p, we have p′1 ≥ p. Therefore, for each user i ∈ Z2
it follows that bi ≤ p ≤ p′1, and all users in Z2 will be
allocated. It implies that:
f(Z ′2) ≥ f(Z2) ≥
f(Z)
4
≥
f(Z ′1)
4
≥
L
2
,
where the second inequality follows from Corollary 1,
and the third inequality follows from the fact that f(Z)
is computed over the whole user set U , while f(Z ′1) is
computed over a smaller sample set S ′ with the same
budget B.
Combining case 1) and case 2), we have that at least
L/2 tasks will be allocated at the last stage with a constant
probability.
C. Proof of Lemma 10
Consider a user i with true type θi = (ai, di, τi, ci), and
reported strategy type θˆi = (aˆi, dˆi, τi, bi). According to the
Hetero-OMG mechanism, at each time step t ∈ [aˆi, dˆi],
there may be a new decision on how many tasks allocated
to user i, and at what price per task. For convenience, let T ′t ,
L′t, b
∗
t , and St denote the end time of the current stage, the
residual number of tasks, the current bid threshold, and the
set of selected users respectively at time step t and before
making decision on user i. Let θˆ−i denote the strategy types
of all users excluding θˆi. We first prove the following two
propositions.
Proposition (a): at some time step t ∈ [aˆi, dˆi], fix b∗t and
L′t, reporting the true cost is a dominant strategy for user
i. It can be easily proved since the decision at time step t
is bid-independent.
Proposition (b): fix bi and θˆ−i, reporting the true ar-
rival/departure time is a dominant strategy for user i. It’s
because that user i is always given a payment equal to
the maximum payment attained during its reported arrival-
departure interval. Assume that user i can obtain the
maximum payment at time step t ∈ [aˆi, dˆi]. Then reporting
an earlier arrival time or a later departure time than t does
not affect the payment of user i. However, if user i reports
a later arrival time or an earlier departure time than t, then
it will obtain a lower payment.
Based on the proposition (b), it is sufficient to prove this
lemma by adding a third proposition:
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Proposition (c): fix [ai, di] and θˆ−i, reporting the true
cost is a dominant strategy for user i. According to the
proposition (a), reporting a false cost at time step t cannot
improve user i’s payment at the current time. Thus, it only
needs to prove that reporting a false cost at time step
t ∈ [ai, di) still cannot improve user i’s payment at time
step t′(t < t′ ≤ di). In the following, we consider two
cases according to whether user i is selected as a winner
by reporting its true type at time step t = ai.
Case 1): User i is a winner at time step t = ai.
In this case it satisfies ci ≤ b∗t and
∑
j∈St
fj < L
′
t, and
it can obtain the payment min{τi, L′t −
∑
j∈St
fj}b∗t . At
time t′(t < t′ < T ′t), user i will obtain the payment
min{τi, L′t′ −
∑
j∈St′
fj}b∗t if it satisfies bi ≤ b∗t and∑
j∈St′
fj < L
′
t′ , otherwise it will obtain the payment 0.
Because L′t′ −
∑
j∈St′
fj ≤ L′t −
∑
j∈St
fj , user i cannot
obtain higher payment at time step t′ than that at t. It
implies that a user cannot improve its payment by reporting
a false cost if its arrival-departure interval does not span
more than one stage.
Now we consider user i’s payment at time step t′(T ′t ≤ t′ ≤
di) if its arrival-departure interval spans multiple stages.
According to the proposition (a), user i’s payment at time
step t′ depends on b∗t′ and L′t′ . Because b∗t′ is independent
with bi, it only needs to consider the effect of bi on L′t′ .
If user i reports a false cost bi that still satisfies bi ≤ b∗t
and
∑
j∈St
fj < L
′
t, then it is still accepted with payment
min{τi, L′t −
∑
j∈St
fj}b∗t at time step t, and thus L′t′
remains unchanged. If user i reports a larger bid bi > ci
and bi > b∗t , then it will not selected at time step t. In this
case, more tasks will be allocated to other users, and L′t′
will be diminished. Therefore, user i cannot obtain higher
payment at time step t′.
Case 2): User i is not a winner at time step t = ai.
In this case it satisfies ci > b∗t , or
∑
j∈St
fj = L
′
t. In
case ci > b
∗
t , if user i reports a false cost bi which still
satisfies bi > b∗t , then the outcome remains unchanged. If
user i reports a lower bid bi < ci and bi ≤ b∗t , then it
will be accepted at price b∗t at time step t. In such case,
however, its utility will be negative. In addition, L′t′ remains
unchanged, and thus user i’s payment at time step t′ > t is
not affected. In case
∑
j∈St
fj = L
′
t, reporting a false cost
does not affect the outcome at time step t or the residual
budget L′t′ at time step t′ > t. To sum up, reporting a false
cost cannot improve user i’s payment at time step t′ > t.
Therefore, the above three propositions together com-
plete the proof.
